Operation Sindoor Shifts Military Balance in Pakistan Toward Air Force
Following Operation Sindoor, Pakistan's military dynamics have shifted, with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) gaining operational ascendency over the traditionally dominant Army. This shift highlights the PAF's technological advancements and strategic importance.
Pakistan Air ForceOperation SindoorMilitary BalancePakistan ArmyElectronic WarfareReal Estate NewsMay 27, 2025
Real Estate News:Chandigarh: A subtle, but perceptible shift appears to be underway within Pakistan’s omnipresent military establishment, with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) seemingly gaining operational ascendency over the traditionally dominant Army in the post-Operation Sindoor scenario.
Open-source intelligence and online tracking data have revealed that over four days of hostilities, the PAF effectively dominated airspace management and electronic warfare (EW) dynamics, in countering Indian Air Force (IAF) strikes on nine terrorist camps across Pakistan, early on May 7.
In contrast, the Army’s ground-based air defences (GDAD) were reportedly sluggish, reactive, and heavily reliant on the PAF for early warning and threat engagement, reducing its operational role to that of a ‘tactical adjunct’. And, for the first time in a major and direct confrontation with India, the Army was publicly overshadowed by the PAF’s performance that earned it plaudits from foreign observers, Pakistan’s civil-military elite, and segments of its informed public, at home and abroad.
‘Still in charge’
A cross-section of defence analysts and Pakistan watchers believe this operational ‘imbalance’ may have prompted last week’s elevation of Army Chief General Asim Munir to the five-star rank of Field Marshal, which has also been interpreted as an attempt to reassert the Army’s primacy. As one Pakistani commentator drolly noted, the extra star on Munir’s upgraded epaulettes has come as a reminder to Pakistanis of who was still in charge.
Even Pakistan’s political leadership, media, and service veterans feted and spotlighted Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu for the PAF’s performance in Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos (wall of lead), shifting focus away from the Army’s ubiquitous General Headquarters or GHQ in Rawalpindi, to Air HQ in nearby Islamabad. In turn, this collectively acknowledged the PAF’s reputation as a ‘technologically forward-leaning service’, appreciably punching way above its institutional weight.
Such repositioning has further spurred speculation in some security quarters that Pakistan’s civilian administration was shrewdly pitting the PAF against the Army, mirroring tactics long employed by the latter to manipulate and control the country’s polity. And, in recognition of the PAF’s capable and professional working, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved a service extension for ACM Sidhu on May 20, making him the second Pakistani air chief to receive such a tenure after ACM Anwar Shamin in 1981. Curiously, however, the length of Sidhu’s new term has not been publicly disclosed, prompting speculation that this ambiguity could reflect a ‘calculated’ move, possibly at Munir’s behest, to reassert the Army’s overarching primacy.
The PAF’s edge, insiders said, stemmed primarily from its AI-enabled EW and real-time sensor fusion capabilities developed presciently since 2018 with quiet Chinese assistance via the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Cell at Air HQ.
China’s role
Analysts said this partnership with Beijing had transformed the PAF from a ‘reactive force to a battlespace shaper’. Its ability to integrate radar feeds, Chinese BeiDou and Gaofen satellite imagery, and drone and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)-sourced electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) in real time had further enabled it to pre-position assets in ‘kill-zones’ and execute precision strikes and missile evasions for itself on May 7, a point noted by some defence analysts in India.
This advantage was further amplified and operationalised by its advanced fleet of AI-supported Chinese-origin fighters like JF-10C/CE Vigorous Dragons and JF-17 Thunders, both armed with PL-15/E beyond visual range missiles and upgraded F-16s, all backed by Saab 2000 ‘Erieye’ AEW&C platforms. Military sources said the PAF had further executed jugaad or innovation on these fighters to further enhance their EW and radar lethality and precision weapon deliverability.
Pakistan claimed to have shot down five IAF fighters during this engagement, but India has neither confirmed nor denied any platform downing, only acknowledging that combat aircraft losses were incumbent in such missions. Independent estimates, however, suggest India may have lost between two and four fighters in standoff engagements with the PAF, but specific details were unavailable for now.
Political backing
A Pakistani analyst observed that after Operation Sindoor, the PAF may have gained ascendancy in perception, credibility, and tactical competence – especially among military professionals – but it lacked the political levers to domestically press its advantage. It also had little or no control over narrative-building, which remained firmly in the hands of the Army-run Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the institution that orchestrates its vice-like grip over the state apparatus.
The Army, on the other hand, he said – declining to be named – continued to enjoy pre-eminence over Pakistan’s security architecture, including control of its nuclear arsenal and influence over political, economic, diplomatic, and ideological trajectories. However, despite its clout, it had still come in for quiet criticism in recent days over delays in deployment during India’s Op Sindoor and was also being quietly faulted for politicising its strategic messaging and clinging to outdated ‘myths’ around strategic depth. Many considered these as ‘feeble’ explanations for its apparent operational inefficiencies.
Meanwhile, the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) – though integral to Pakistan’s nuclear triad responsible for delivering nuclear weapons by land, air, and sea – have historically remained subordinate to the Army, despite fulfilling critical conventional roles.
This structural imbalance dates back to Partition, when the Army received a disproportionate share of personnel and resources, institutionalising its dominance and reinforcing the oft-quoted maxim: most countries have an army, but Pakistan’s army has a country.
At independence, the PN inherited around 3,000 personnel and a modest fleet of four sloops, patrol craft, and auxiliary vessels from the Royal Indian Navy. The PAF began with approximately 2,000–2,500 personnel and a single operational fighter squadron of 16 outdated Hawker Tempest IIs – its share from the Royal Indian Air Force.
For years afterward, all three services were commanded by British officers and lacked indigenous leadership, infrastructure, or strategic depth. But this absence was more acutely felt in the PAF and PN, which emerged as auxiliary arms to the Army – an institution that swiftly established itself as Pakistan’s paramount authority.
Nearly eight decades later, this organisational imbalance persists. The Army’s 560,000-strong force dwarfs the PAF’s 70,000 and the PN’s 30,000 personnel. The Army’s dominance was further entrenched through coups, by ruling Pakistan directly for 34 years, and wielding indirect control for much of the remaining 44.
Army hegemony through history
History too aided the Army’s hegemony. Cast from inception as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology and borders, the Army fought four land-centric wars with India – three over Kashmir – further supplementing its central role as a fighting force. It realised early on that coups were easier when tanks are near the capital, not parked in hangars or afloat at sea.
Thus, the Army wrote Pakistan’s strategic playbook, cast itself as the lead actor, and relegated the PAF and PN to supporting roles – becoming executive producer, director, and star of the national security theatre.
Domestically, too it monopolised internal security and counter-insurgency operations in the Frontier Agency regions, bordering Afghanistan, and in Baluchistan. It also armed and trained Mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan and later patronised the Taliban.
One of its lieutenant generals has always headed the all-powerful, tri-service ISID as Director General (DG). Notably, though, in the early 1950s – soon after its founding on New Year’s Day in 1948 by Major General Walter Cawthorn, then Pakistan Army Deputy Chief, soon after the Kashmir campaign – a naval officer briefly served as ISID chief. Since then, however, the post has remained the exclusive preserve of the Army.
Even Pakistan’s highest-ranking four-star military officer – the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), tasked with tri-service coordination – has almost always been from the Army. Since the post was created in 1976, there have been only two exceptions: a three-star PN officer in 1988 and a similarly ranked PAF officer in 1994, each serving for three-year stints. From 1997, however, the CJCSC’s role has remained firmly within the Army’s domain.
Similarly, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) – responsible for the command, control, and oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and strategic forces – has, since its inception in 2000, always been headed by a three-star Army officer. Although structured as a tri-service body, the SPD reflects the Army’s belief that nuclear weapons are an extension of its conventional deterrence posture vis-à-vis India. Consequently, the PAF’s and PN’s strategic assets report to the Army-run SPD, further reinforcing its overarching authority.
The Army’s influence extends well beyond the battlefield.
It controls sprawling business conglomerates such as the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Frontier Works Organisation, and National Logistics Cell. These entities operate extensive commercial ventures across sectors including real estate, housing, highway construction, mining, and food production including sugar and cereals – dominating large segments of Pakistan’s economy and retail markets.
Proficiency over boots on the ground
Critics argue that these ventures blur the lines between military and civilian economy, as these conglomerates enjoy tax exemptions and preferential treatment. Retired Army officers often secure lucrative post-retirement jobs in them and though created as soldier welfare schemes, these concerns now play an indispensable role in Pakistan’s economy.
In contrast, the PAF and PN run relatively modest, welfare-oriented ventures. The PAF’s Shaheen (Falcon) Foundation engages in limited real estate and healthcare services, while the PN’s Bahria Foundation operates schools, colleges, and provides restricted port and ship management services.
Open-source intelligence and online tracking data have revealed that over four days of hostilities, the PAF effectively dominated airspace management and electronic warfare (EW) dynamics, in countering Indian Air Force (IAF) strikes on nine terrorist camps across Pakistan, early on May 7.
In contrast, the Army’s ground-based air defences (GDAD) were reportedly sluggish, reactive, and heavily reliant on the PAF for early warning and threat engagement, reducing its operational role to that of a ‘tactical adjunct’. And, for the first time in a major and direct confrontation with India, the Army was publicly overshadowed by the PAF’s performance that earned it plaudits from foreign observers, Pakistan’s civil-military elite, and segments of its informed public, at home and abroad.
‘Still in charge’
A cross-section of defence analysts and Pakistan watchers believe this operational ‘imbalance’ may have prompted last week’s elevation of Army Chief General Asim Munir to the five-star rank of Field Marshal, which has also been interpreted as an attempt to reassert the Army’s primacy. As one Pakistani commentator drolly noted, the extra star on Munir’s upgraded epaulettes has come as a reminder to Pakistanis of who was still in charge.
Even Pakistan’s political leadership, media, and service veterans feted and spotlighted Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu for the PAF’s performance in Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos (wall of lead), shifting focus away from the Army’s ubiquitous General Headquarters or GHQ in Rawalpindi, to Air HQ in nearby Islamabad. In turn, this collectively acknowledged the PAF’s reputation as a ‘technologically forward-leaning service’, appreciably punching way above its institutional weight.
Such repositioning has further spurred speculation in some security quarters that Pakistan’s civilian administration was shrewdly pitting the PAF against the Army, mirroring tactics long employed by the latter to manipulate and control the country’s polity. And, in recognition of the PAF’s capable and professional working, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved a service extension for ACM Sidhu on May 20, making him the second Pakistani air chief to receive such a tenure after ACM Anwar Shamin in 1981. Curiously, however, the length of Sidhu’s new term has not been publicly disclosed, prompting speculation that this ambiguity could reflect a ‘calculated’ move, possibly at Munir’s behest, to reassert the Army’s overarching primacy.
The PAF’s edge, insiders said, stemmed primarily from its AI-enabled EW and real-time sensor fusion capabilities developed presciently since 2018 with quiet Chinese assistance via the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Cell at Air HQ.
China’s role
Analysts said this partnership with Beijing had transformed the PAF from a ‘reactive force to a battlespace shaper’. Its ability to integrate radar feeds, Chinese BeiDou and Gaofen satellite imagery, and drone and Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)-sourced electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) in real time had further enabled it to pre-position assets in ‘kill-zones’ and execute precision strikes and missile evasions for itself on May 7, a point noted by some defence analysts in India.
This advantage was further amplified and operationalised by its advanced fleet of AI-supported Chinese-origin fighters like JF-10C/CE Vigorous Dragons and JF-17 Thunders, both armed with PL-15/E beyond visual range missiles and upgraded F-16s, all backed by Saab 2000 ‘Erieye’ AEW&C platforms. Military sources said the PAF had further executed jugaad or innovation on these fighters to further enhance their EW and radar lethality and precision weapon deliverability.
Pakistan claimed to have shot down five IAF fighters during this engagement, but India has neither confirmed nor denied any platform downing, only acknowledging that combat aircraft losses were incumbent in such missions. Independent estimates, however, suggest India may have lost between two and four fighters in standoff engagements with the PAF, but specific details were unavailable for now.
Political backing
A Pakistani analyst observed that after Operation Sindoor, the PAF may have gained ascendancy in perception, credibility, and tactical competence – especially among military professionals – but it lacked the political levers to domestically press its advantage. It also had little or no control over narrative-building, which remained firmly in the hands of the Army-run Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the institution that orchestrates its vice-like grip over the state apparatus.
The Army, on the other hand, he said – declining to be named – continued to enjoy pre-eminence over Pakistan’s security architecture, including control of its nuclear arsenal and influence over political, economic, diplomatic, and ideological trajectories. However, despite its clout, it had still come in for quiet criticism in recent days over delays in deployment during India’s Op Sindoor and was also being quietly faulted for politicising its strategic messaging and clinging to outdated ‘myths’ around strategic depth. Many considered these as ‘feeble’ explanations for its apparent operational inefficiencies.
Meanwhile, the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) – though integral to Pakistan’s nuclear triad responsible for delivering nuclear weapons by land, air, and sea – have historically remained subordinate to the Army, despite fulfilling critical conventional roles.
This structural imbalance dates back to Partition, when the Army received a disproportionate share of personnel and resources, institutionalising its dominance and reinforcing the oft-quoted maxim: most countries have an army, but Pakistan’s army has a country.
At independence, the PN inherited around 3,000 personnel and a modest fleet of four sloops, patrol craft, and auxiliary vessels from the Royal Indian Navy. The PAF began with approximately 2,000–2,500 personnel and a single operational fighter squadron of 16 outdated Hawker Tempest IIs – its share from the Royal Indian Air Force.
For years afterward, all three services were commanded by British officers and lacked indigenous leadership, infrastructure, or strategic depth. But this absence was more acutely felt in the PAF and PN, which emerged as auxiliary arms to the Army – an institution that swiftly established itself as Pakistan’s paramount authority.
Nearly eight decades later, this organisational imbalance persists. The Army’s 560,000-strong force dwarfs the PAF’s 70,000 and the PN’s 30,000 personnel. The Army’s dominance was further entrenched through coups, by ruling Pakistan directly for 34 years, and wielding indirect control for much of the remaining 44.
Army hegemony through history
History too aided the Army’s hegemony. Cast from inception as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology and borders, the Army fought four land-centric wars with India – three over Kashmir – further supplementing its central role as a fighting force. It realised early on that coups were easier when tanks are near the capital, not parked in hangars or afloat at sea.
Thus, the Army wrote Pakistan’s strategic playbook, cast itself as the lead actor, and relegated the PAF and PN to supporting roles – becoming executive producer, director, and star of the national security theatre.
Domestically, too it monopolised internal security and counter-insurgency operations in the Frontier Agency regions, bordering Afghanistan, and in Baluchistan. It also armed and trained Mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan and later patronised the Taliban.
One of its lieutenant generals has always headed the all-powerful, tri-service ISID as Director General (DG). Notably, though, in the early 1950s – soon after its founding on New Year’s Day in 1948 by Major General Walter Cawthorn, then Pakistan Army Deputy Chief, soon after the Kashmir campaign – a naval officer briefly served as ISID chief. Since then, however, the post has remained the exclusive preserve of the Army.
Even Pakistan’s highest-ranking four-star military officer – the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), tasked with tri-service coordination – has almost always been from the Army. Since the post was created in 1976, there have been only two exceptions: a three-star PN officer in 1988 and a similarly ranked PAF officer in 1994, each serving for three-year stints. From 1997, however, the CJCSC’s role has remained firmly within the Army’s domain.
Similarly, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) – responsible for the command, control, and oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and strategic forces – has, since its inception in 2000, always been headed by a three-star Army officer. Although structured as a tri-service body, the SPD reflects the Army’s belief that nuclear weapons are an extension of its conventional deterrence posture vis-à-vis India. Consequently, the PAF’s and PN’s strategic assets report to the Army-run SPD, further reinforcing its overarching authority.
The Army’s influence extends well beyond the battlefield.
It controls sprawling business conglomerates such as the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Frontier Works Organisation, and National Logistics Cell. These entities operate extensive commercial ventures across sectors including real estate, housing, highway construction, mining, and food production including sugar and cereals – dominating large segments of Pakistan’s economy and retail markets.
Proficiency over boots on the ground
Critics argue that these ventures blur the lines between military and civilian economy, as these conglomerates enjoy tax exemptions and preferential treatment. Retired Army officers often secure lucrative post-retirement jobs in them and though created as soldier welfare schemes, these concerns now play an indispensable role in Pakistan’s economy.
In contrast, the PAF and PN run relatively modest, welfare-oriented ventures. The PAF’s Shaheen (Falcon) Foundation engages in limited real estate and healthcare services, while the PN’s Bahria Foundation operates schools, colleges, and provides restricted port and ship management services.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Operation Sindoor?
Operation Sindoor was a military operation conducted by India against terrorist camps in Pakistan. It involved airstrikes by the Indian Air Force (IAF) on nine terrorist camps on May 7, 2023.
How did the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) perform during Operation Sindoor?
The PAF effectively dominated airspace management and electronic warfare (EW) during Operation Sindoor, countering IAF strikes and earning plaudits from foreign observers and Pakistan’s civil-military elite.
What is the significance of the Army Chief General Asim Munir's elevation to Field Marshal?
General Asim Munir's elevation to Field Marshal is seen as an attempt to reassert the Army's primacy and remind the public of the Army's continued control over Pakistan’s military and political landscape.
How has China assisted the PAF in its technological advancements?
China has provided the PAF with advanced AI-enabled electronic warfare (EW) and real-time sensor fusion capabilities through the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Cell at Air HQ, transforming the PAF into a technologically forward-leaning service.
What is the role of the Pakistan Navy (PN) in Pakistan's military structure?
The PN, while integral to Pakistan’s nuclear triad, has historically remained subordinate to the Army. It fulfills critical conventional roles but lacks the political and operational levers enjoyed by the Army.
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